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recently, psychologists and neuroscientists have provided a great deal of evidence 
showing that perceptual experiences are mostly multimodal. as perceivers, we don’t 
usually recognize them as such. We think of the experiences we are having as either 
visual, or auditory or tactile, not realising that they often arise from the fusion of 
different sensory inputs. The experience of tasting something is one such case. What we 
call ‘taste’ is the result of the multisensory integration of touch taste and smell. These 
unified flavour experiences provide a challenge when trying to reconcile the underlying 
processing story with the conscious experience of subjects, but they also challenge 
assumptions about our access to our own experiences and whether how we conceive of 
those experiences plays any in role in accounting for their ultimate nature.
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our most fundamental contact with the world comes through our senses. 
they inform us about our immediate surroundings and our embodied selves. 
but as many philosophers have pointed out, they can also mislead and dis-
tort. the unreliability of the senses convinced the rationalist philosopher 
Rene Descartes that that they could not provide a firm basis for our knowl-
edge of the external world. instead, he thought a purely rational faculty was 
necessary to provide us with knowledge of reality. by contrast, the empiri-
cists believed that the contents of the mind were all derived from the senses, 
and taking this position to its ultimate end, david hume adopted a thor-
oughgoing agnosticism about the causes of our sensory impressions. Work-
ing from within experience, he argued that there was no standpoint from 
which to compare items before the mind with things in the outer world; so 
anything we said about that outer realm would be mere speculation. 
in accepting this epistemological gap between the mind and the world, 
rationalists and empiricists both took for granted that we had immedi-
ate knowledge of how our senses presented things to us; i.e. of how they 
appeared in the light of our senses. but for different reasons, they both 
thought that such sensory experiences could not provide a sufficient basis 
on which to conclude anything about the external realm. the distinction 
invoked here between appearance and reality coincided with the divide be-
tween mind and world, and although we could not be certain of how things 
were in reality, we could, on the basis of experience alone, be certain of how 
things appeared to us. experience, was taken to be knowable through and 
through, and was, in effect, just a matter of things appearing a certain way 
to us as subjects. The philosophical task was to find a way to cross the divide 
between how experience presented things to us and how they really were; 
a task that hume subsequently abandoned. however, both descartes and 
hume assumed that we had immediate knowledge of how things were in our 
experience, despite descartes’ method of doubt where he questioned every-
thing that he had previously taken for granted. 
it is the assumption that we can straightforwardly recognize how things are 
in our experience that i want to question. this is not because of the direct 
realist’s claim that appearances that present things as they are and those 
in which are just appearances are sometimes indistinguishable by subjects. 
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instead, the case i am interested in is where aspects of our experience go 
missing in how things appear to us; i.e., a case where there are properties 
of our experience that we fail at first, to recognise. This is to suggest that 
an appearance-reality distinction operates within experience itself. to 
some, this will sound unintelligible. Surely, things appearing a certain way 
to a subject just is what it is for that subject to have a conscious experience. 
there is simply no room for a gap between appearance and reality within 
experience. and since the senses shape our perceptual experiences, we are 
bound to know their sensory character; i.e., they  are either cases of seeing, 
hearing, smelling, touching or tasting. 
this view, i will argue, is utterly mistaken. We can be misled by, and about, 
our perceptual experiences and can fail to recognise the senses we are exer-
cising when having those experiences, as recent work on the senses in psy-
chology and neuroscience shows. how things appear to us within experience 
is not always how they are. i will illustrate this general point by considering 
the case i know best: that involving tastes and tasting. 
eating, or sipping something, will produce a distinctive experience in the 
mouth. These are fleeting experiences, quickly over and done with, that are 
hard to concentrate on but which leave us with an immediate hedonic reac-
tion, of liking or disliking. What really goes on in tasting experiences, and 
what do they provide us with experiences of? these are the key question, 
and as we shall see later, liking and disliking are important distractors.
When tasting we think we are getting most of our information from the 
tongue. But in fact very little comes from there. Receptor firings on the 
tongue code for ‘basic tastes’ such as salt, sweet, sour, bitter, savoury, metal-
lic. and yet these gustatory properties don’t exhaust what we are capable of 
tasting. Think of tasting ‘ripe mangoes, fresh figs, lemon, canteloupe melon, 
raspberries, coconut, green olives, ripe persimmon, onion, caraway, parsnip, 
peppermint, aniseed, cinnamon, fresh salmon’ (Sibley 2006, p. 216). We don’t 
have receptors for melon or onion, or any of these other things. these are not 
tastes: they are flavours and our ability to experience them depends on more 
than taste alone. Notice, that we cannot construct such flavours from combi-
nation of basic tastes alone. as Frank Sibley put it:
Coconut may be somewhat sweet, and lemon sour or acid, but what other 
tastes combine with sweetness to give coconut, or with sourness or acidity 
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to give lemon? how could one construct a blend of distinguishable tastes…to 
yield that of coconut, or lemon, or mint? Try to imagine a recipe: ‘To make the 
flavour of onion (or pepper, or raspberries, or olives), add the following [basic 
tastes] in the following proportions . . . ’ (Sibley 2006, pp. 216-7).
there is no such procedure. however, the act of tasting gives us knowledge 
of these easily identifiable flavours. So the objects of perception in tasting 
are not tastes, but flavours. tastes proper are only a part of what contributes 
to our experience of tasting something. taste exclusively concerns the gus-
tatory dimension of flavour perception: it is the upshot of taste receptors 
firing in the oral cavity, on the tongue and in the gut.  
in fact, the sensations that the tongue produces - gustatory sensations - are 
hard to experience alone save in experimental settings, for example, when 
drops are put on parts of an anaestheticed tongue and we prevent any other 
sensations, of smell say, from contributing to the subject’s experience. So 
what we call ‘taste’ is not just sensations from the tongue but the perception 
of flavour, and even what we think of as experiences of the so-called basic 
tastes, like sweet, sour, salty, etc. may, in fact, be experiences of flavours. 
(See Spence, Auvray and Smith 2013). But what are flavours and how do we 
perceive them?
let’s start by asking how tasting produces experiences that provide knowl-
edge of flavours:
although the experience of the sensory qualities of a food are often de-
scribed in terms of how it ‘‘tastes”, in practice this experience of flavour is a 
complex interaction (yeomans et al. 2008)
it is in effect, a multi-sensory product: a fusion (confusion?) of different 
inputs. Yet, the seemingly unified experience of flavour gives us little clue 
that it is a complex interaction effect, which may be why we think of it as 
just taste. the missing element, along with taste, that contributes to the 
experience of flavour is smell. But it is easy to miss this when thinking of 
smell as we ordinarily do, as the sniffing of odours in the environment. This 
is orthonasal olfaction: the inhaling of odours from our surroundings. but we 
need to follow Paul rozin in distinguishing two senses of smell: orthonasal 
olfaction and retronasal olfaction (rozin 1982). 
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an odour molecule may reach the olfactory epithelium in the nose (ortho-
nasal olfaction) or the mouth (retronasal olfaction). When an odor is sensed 
orthonasally, it is perceived as originating from the external world. in con-
trast, when an odour is sensed retronasally, it is perceived as [arising] from 
the mouth (murphy et al. 1977; rozin 1982) quoted in Small et al. 2005, p. 593.
Orthonsal olfaction allows us to detect environmental stimuli: predators, 
smoke, food, or mates. retronasal olfaction allows us assess what we have just 
swallowed, letting us know whether to reject it or continue eating.
With orthonasal and retronasal olfaction, ‘the same receptors in the olfacto-
ry epithelium are activated but depending on the direction of flow of odours 
they project to different cortical areas’ (Small et al. 2005). this can result in 
different conscious experiences of the same odours. When airflow is from 
the mouth to the nose, we tend to get ‘oral referral’ with the smell turning 
up as an experience in the mouth classified as ‘taste’, perhaps due to the 
simultaneous presence in the oral cavity of touch, or a tastant. this is what 
rozin calls ‘the location illusion’, and when it occurs we get an inseparable 
combination of taste and retronasal smell leading to a unified experience of 
flavour. This fusing (or confusing) of smell and taste was demonstrated by 
murphy et al. (1977) in normal subjects with purely odour-induced tastes:  
When an aqueous (but tasteless) olfactory stimulus is placed into the mouth, 
subjects consistently interpret the sensation as a taste, rather than a smell, 
and state that the flavour is centered on the tongue, even though the sensory 
perception is principally mediated via the olfactory system. (gottfried 2005, p. 
473 )
Conversely, there are taste-induced odours. When subjects chew mint-fla-
voured chewing gum until it loses its sweetness and ‘taste’ (odour) of mint, 
they can be asked to remove it from the mouth and rub it in icing sugar. 
When they put it back in the mouth, the mint returns even though there is 
no mint in icing sugar. here, the recurrence of a taste boosts sub-threshold 
olfaction raising it to awareness.
Normally, the experience of flavour requires taste and retronasal olfaction, 
incorporating the smelling of odours arising from the mouth:
The use of the same word, ‘taste’, to refer to flavour and to the true gustatory 
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sensations of salty, sweet, sour and bitter leads to a variety of confusions. for 
a clinical example, where patients lost olfaction, they often report that they 
cannot taste or smell. however, when questioned, patients acknowledge that 
they taste salty, sweet, sour and bitter, but ‘nothing else’. The ‘nothing else’ is 
the contribution of retronasal olfaction to flavour. (Bartoshuk and Duffy 1998, 
p. 284)
thus, smell contributes most to what we call ‘taste’ and yet this element of 
smell goes missing in experience. So, not everything about the experience 
of tasting is immediately available as part of a subject’s awareness. We are 
mistaken about the nature of these experiences: we tend to think they are 
tastes and due to sensations from the tongue. We think we know this be-
cause we think we have immediate access to these ‘simple’ sensations. tast-
ing was therefore thought to be thought rather simple, and until recently it 
remained vastly underexplored. the exception was brillat-Savarin, writing 
in the nineteenth century, who was ‘tempted to believe that smell & taste 
are in fact but a single sense, whose laboratory is in the mouth & whose 
chimney is the nose’ (brillat-Savarin 1835, p. 41).
We have concluded that what we call our experience of the ‘taste’ (flavour) 
of something arises through the multimodal integration of taste proper 
with retronasal olfaction. but to that we have to add somatosensory sensa-
tions, mechanoreceptors triggered by chewing, and trigeminal irritation. 
chemical irritation of trigeminal nerve - the facial nerve that innervate 
the eyes, the nose and the mouth - is responsible for sensations of ‘cool-
ness’ when eating peppermint, and the sensation of ‘heat’ when eating 
spicy food like mustard, even though there is no change of temperature in 
the mouth. eating too much horseradish or wasabi mustard will burn at 
the bridge of the nose, not in the mouth, although the capsaicin in chilli 
will cause both trigeminal irritation and local oral burning. the trigemi-
nal contribution is one of the hidden flavour senses, showing just how 
multisensory flavour perception really is:
arguably, multi-sensory integration may be at its most extreme in the case 
of flavour perception since few other experiences offer the opportunity 
for concomitant stimulation of all the major senses: gustation through 
the five primary tastes, olfaction through both ortho- and retronasal 
stimulation of olfactory receptors by volatile compounds released from food, 
mechanoreception contributing to our perception of texture and providing 
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information on temperature, pain arising from oral irritants and hearing that 
results from sounds and vibrations coming from the mouth contributing to our 
perception of aspects of texture.(yeomans et al. 2008, p. 565)
notice that we can selectively attend to some of the multisensory compo-
nents of flavour experience, such as the contribution touch makes to tast-
ing: i.e. when a food or liquid’s is described as being creamy, oily, crunchy, 
melting. but even the contribution of touch is not always so easily sepa-
rable. Biscuits that ‘taste’ stale will have, at first, all the same taste and 
smell properties as fresh biscuits; it is simply that they crumble differently 
and this texture clue predicts decay and leads to us say they ‘taste’ stale. 
Similarly, the carbonation in fizzy drinks is a trigeminal irritant but it is 
hard to separate it from the way fizzy water, soda drinks or Champagne 
‘taste’ to us. 
another reason for missing things in our tasting experiences is because, 
at first, we don’t recognise that ‘flavour perception is not a single event 
but a dynamic process with a series of events’ (Piggott 1994). tasting has a 
dynamic time course and slowing it down makes a difference to what we 
notice and what we can pick out. in this way, how we taste affects what we 
taste; and attending to each aspect of the dynamic time course changes 
the temporal scale of our tasting experience, allowing us to focus on par-
ticular qualities of the taste, texture and aroma of the foods and liquids 
we ingest. (it does not, however, mean that we can separate taste and ret-
ronasal olfaction.)
taking these factors into account, how should we understand our experiences 
of flavour, what gives them the modal signatures they have for us, and how 
much of are we aware of in those experiences? We usually consider what we 
are experiencing when tasting as tastes, though it is still far from clear why 
we classify them as such, or how we conceive as this classification. Tasting 
is the activity through which we perceive the flavours of foods and liquids, 
like lemon, chicken or onion that we (mis)classify as tastes. as yeomans says 
(above), the experience of flavour is a complex interaction effect. And yet, in 
the phenomenology of tasting, the experiences we have can strike us as whole, 
unified percepts. On the basis of that phenomenology, we are often unable to 
distinguish the sensory components that feed into such experiences. there 
may be no distinguishable, separable parts to a single flavour experience of 
raspberry, say, although we may be able to recognise the presence of single 
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flavours in a complex dish or wine. So how should we think of the parts that 
contribute to the experience of tasting a single flavour?1
must we say that we are mistaken about the nature of such tasting experi-
ences, treating them as simple and unimodal when they are in fact complex 
and multimodal? that depends on which kind of facts we should turn to in 
order to settle questions about the nature of flavour experiences. Are they an-
swerable for their nature to facts about the sensory processing that gives rise 
to them, enabling us to view them as products of multisensory integration? 
or, as conscious experiences, should we take them to be just as we experience 
them: whole, unified experiences that are, in effect, just as they appear? 
those who take experiences to be simply a matter of how things appear 
consciously to a subject will suppose that a satisfactory account of their 
nature must be answerable to the phenomenological facts. thus, it will 
be facts about the phenomenological character of those experiences that 
settles questions about the true extent and nature of those experiences. 
but how should we appeal to the facts about phenomenological character 
of our sensory experiences? What does it mean to reflect on them, and are 
the facts about their phenomenological character so transparently available 
to us are they self-illuminating? Just a matter of what occurs in conscious-
ness? that issue will depend in turn on how we think about consciousness, 
and whether, for example, we accept ned block’s distinction between access 
and phenomenal consciousness (a-consciousness and p-consciousness, see 
block 2002) how much within consciousness goings on falls within the scope 
of the subject’s awareness at any moment? Is it only what we reflect on that 
features in the facts about our flavour experiences? (I doubt that this is the 
right way to think of them.) but more pertinently, do we have bare encoun-
ters with the phenomenological facts of sensory consciousness? or is what’s 
available to us when reflecting on our conscious experience largely a matter 
of the phenomenological taxonomy we deploy to classify our experiences?  
remember, being in a mental state is one thing: knowing what mental state 
one is in is another. the phenomenology is there but how should we taxono-
mize it? is it an itch or a pain i’m experiencing? am i exhilarated or anxious? 
the felt state itself does not decide? Philosophers are wont to forget this, and 
assume that the character of experience is transparently available to sub-
1  notice, if such experiences are the result of a combination of “several inputs” coming from 
different sensory channels, there is a further far from easy to answer question about how these 
‘senses’ are to be individuated (see grice 1962).
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jects of experience, using misleading talk of ‘what it is like’ to undergo such 
experiences. Whereas, it much more accurate to think that what i bring into 
focus as a result of directing my attention to how things are with me, be-
cause of this current phenomenological state, is what i take it to be like.  that 
is, hot on the heels of our experience, and almost inseparable from it, is how 
we take an experience to be, and our take on our own experience is so tightly 
wedded to the occurrence of that experience itself that we often don’t no-
tice there is an extra step to take and one which may be wrong in taking. 
In the case of flavour experiences, our ordinary phenomenological tax-
onomy classifies them as unimodal experiences of taste; while psychology 
and neuroscience shows us that these seemingly simple ‘tastes’ are, in fact, 
the upshot of multimodal processing of olfactory, gustatory and oral so-
matosensory, trigeminal (and according to some auditory and visual) infor-
mation, modulated by tasting’s dynamic time course. This neuroscientific 
classification of tasting experiences is at odds with our own take on them. 
So which of these classifications should we turn to when trying to under-
stand the ultimate nature of those experiences? must appearances (arising 
from our phenomenological taxonomy) be saved at all costs? or should we 
see such appearances as getting something wrong about the ultimate nature 
of flavour experiences, thus requiring us to characterize them in another, 
more scientifically informed way? 
This turns out to be an extraordinarily difficult question to answer. First of 
all, how do we take our experiences of tasting to be when we think of them as 
experiences of ‘taste’? We ordinarily believe experiences of taste to come from 
the tongue, and about this we are definitely wrong. But why does it feel so 
natural to think so? it is not as though the experiences carry any trace of their 
causal origins in the processing order, otherwise we would be mistaking these 
signs. it may seem that they wear their sensory character on their sleeves 
but do they? is the connection to the tongue just a way we think about our 
experiences? or is that because we are receiving sensations of taste and touch 
from the tongue that other sensory attention is captured and the experience 
is referred to the oral cavity? it could also be because we think of ‘tastes’ as 
originating in the foods and liquids we consume and that therefore, because 
our tongue is in contact with those substances it must be transmitting what 
we experience. 
on the other hand, we could say that we are simply confusing ‘taste’ and 
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flavour, and that when we use the word ‘taste’ we are really talking about 
flavour. But then the mistake would be that we are thinking of flavour expe-
riences as the upshot of one sense: as unimodal instead of multimodal expe-
riences. or, we could say that whatever word we use, we are really operating 
as though there was a distinct and distinguishable flavour sense –one the 
exercise of which gives rise to ‘tastes’ or flavour experiences, not realising 
how much that distinct sense draws on the senses of taste proper (gusta-
tion), smell (retronasal olfaction) and touch. (See auvray and Spence 2007.) 
it’s certainly the case that whatever people say or think they actually are ex-
periencing flavours – not tastes. There may be no such thing, experientially, 
as the taste proper of a peach. (See Spence, auvray and Smith 2013.) Without 
retronasal olfaction to discern peach odours there would be just sweetness 
and slipperiness, indistinguishable from other soft fruits. We know the 
experience people call ‘taste’ depends in processing terms on gustation, 
olfaction, somatosensation and sometimes trigeminal stimulation, but is 
the unified experience of flavour always a phenomenologically inseparable 
fusion of elements in experience, or is it a single conscious product of the 
integration of different sensory elements at the underlying processing level? 
the answer to this question lies at the heart of the matter, for what we are 
asking is whether however multisensory the processing of flavour experi-
ences is, are flavour experiences themselves multimodal? 
We do not recognise separable components of those experiences, but are 
different sensory elements nevertheless present in experience?  the impor-
tance of this issue goes far beyond flavour perception since many results 
from cognitive neuroscience recognise are showing us that multimodal per-
ceptions are the rule, not the exception.
there is reason to think our everyday perceptual experience is multimodal. 
We are simultaneously bombarded with sounds and sights, smells and feels, 
along with perhaps a taste in our mouths. We recognise distinct aspects of 
conscious experience, such as seeing or hearing, etc., but we are not aware 
of how interactive the senses are; not aware, that is, of cross-modal interac-
tions where activity in one sense has an impact on another, nor of multisen-
sory integration, where information from different sensory channels merge. 
In the case we are considering, namely, flavour perception, it is hard to rec-
ognise that tasting always involves at least taste, touch and smell. Unlike the 
component of touch, the fusion of retronasal olfaction and gustation seems 
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to be inseparably combined in experience, as we’ve seen. nevertheless, by 
having our attention directed to aspects of flavour perception we can some-
times bring to light elements in these seemingly unified experiences. Think 
of the flavour of menthol, involving as it does: a minty aroma; a slightly 
bitter taste; and a cool sensation in the mouth. all three elements create a 
single, unified percept of menthol flavour. Absent one of them and you no 
longer have the flavour of menthol. However, it is possible to concentrate on 
any one of these co-occurring elements. though we still need to have our 
attention drawn to each component. 
In this way, there is both unity and complexity to our flavour experiences, 
and perhaps these occur at different levels in our mental architecture. nor-
mally, flavours cannot be phenomenologically decomposed into a taste and a 
retronasal smell. So perhaps, the unity of a flavour experience is due to their 
integration at a  pre-perceptual processing level that does not depend in 
any way on what we consciously do when we reflect on, or think about such 
experiences. It is simply in consciousness that we recognise a single, unified 
percept. So if we are talking about binding that occurs at a processing level, 
prior to any decision about, or categorization of, the flavour in question, or 
its qualities, and maybe it is at the processing level where the complexity 
resides. and yet in some cases different sensory elements can be acknowl-
edged as with perception of menthol.
it would be important to have a clear taxonomy of cases – those in which we 
can distinguish different components and those in which we cannot. in the 
case of menthol, we have something more akin to the unity of flavours we 
find in a well-cooked dish where we recognise several flavours as together 
creating a harmonious and appreciable whole. in this case, the combina-
tion is appreciable at the level of perceptual experience. The flavour of the 
dish is perceived as a complex entity, possessing multiple elements or parts. 
Though even here we have a limited ability to identify the single flavours - 
or even particular tastants and odourants - when presented with a mixture 
of tastants or odourants.2 in some cases it may not be very determinate 
whether we are perceiving a single flavour or multiple flavours. However, 
with single flavours like lemon, banana, or onion we need to know what 
contributes to and creates the unity creates a percept of a single flavour ele-
ment. do the sensory elements that combine outside of consciousness still 
make a showing in the conscious experience of a flavour? 
2  See laing, link, Jinks and hutchinson 2002; marshall, laing, Jinks, and hutchinson 2006.
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William James thought there could be experiences unified into whole but 
criticised what he called the “mind-dust theory”:
Take a hundred (feelings), shuffle them and pack them as close together as 
you can (whatever that may mean); still each remains the same feeling it al-
ways was, shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant of what the other feel-
ings are and mean. 
importantly for the the case of multisensory perception, it is James’ view 
that individual experiences can give rise to a more general experience, but 
that the new experience does not contain the individual ones:
There would be a hundred-and-first feeling there, if, when a group or series 
of such feelings were set up, a consciousness belonging to the group as such 
should emerge. and this 101st feeling would be a totally new fact; the 100 
original feelings might, by a curious physical law, be a signal for its creation, 
when they came together; but they would have no substantial identity with 
it, nor it with them, and one could never deduce the one from the others, or (in 
any intelligible sense) say that they evolved it. (James 1890)
applied to the general case of multimodal experience with simultaneous 
sensory inputs, a new experience of a made of auditory, visual and other 
components - components which could in other circumstances be experi-
enced by themselves - but, are not figuring in the multimodal case as com-
ponent parts within conscious experience. as ophelia deroy has put it: ‘this 
supposes that consciousness can host unified objects, but is not what unifies 
the component experiences’. 
the question is whether we should think of cases of multisensory perception - 
the result of multisensory integration - in this way. can we experience the com-
ponents of such experiences by themselves in other circumstances? consider 
the experiment of holding one’s nose while eating a jelly bean. this gives one the 
experience of sweetness or sourness alone, and when one lets go the nose the 
experience is transformed to reveal the flavour of strawberry, or pineapple, etc. 
previously unrevealed. at this point, the taste and retronasal smell have fused 
and they can no longer be separated even by special acts of attention. With nose 
held closed there is a taste of sweetness, then, after letting go a single, unified 
experience of a fruit flavour. So are taste and retronasal smell, nevertheless, 
both present in experience and just not recognised as such because of oral refer-
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ral of the late: the location illusion where retronasal olfactory sensations are 
referred to the oral cavity? it’s not clear. one can experience the sweetness or 
the sourness of the jelly bean, but one cannot, save for elaborate experimental 
set-ups involving inserted tubes, experience retronasal odours by themselves. 
normally, one does not recognise this element of smell at all. 
Of course, in the special case of menthol flavour, we are able to recognise 
the presence of both the slightly bitter taste and the minty aroma. Perhaps 
it’s because a boost is given to the olfactory sensation by the trigeminally 
induced feeling of coolness due to the odour, thus alerting us to a lingering 
minty aroma in the nasal passages. normally, however, we cannot achieve 
such isolation or awareness of the olfactory component, and tasters are usu-
ally surprised to learn that smell is involved so centrally in what they are 
tasting. experience in tasting a single flavour comes as a whole, and only 
some parts of it could be experienced by themselves. 
As all these effects demonstrate, the concoction of flavour experience is in-
tricate and hard to focus on.  but perhaps we should try to get at the nature 
of such experiences neither through a processing account nor the unified 
conscious result, but through what makes them flavour experiences as op-
posed to any other kind of experience. and the way to address this question 
would be to say more about what flavours are and try going on from there to 
give an account of how we experience them. 
Let’s start by considering some definitions of flavour:
(1) Flavour is a ‘complex combination of the olfactory, gustatory and trigeminal 
sensations perceived during tasting. The flavour may be influenced by tactile, 
thermal, painful and/or kinaesthetic effects’ (aFnor 1992)
(2) ‘Flavour perception....should be used as the term for the combinations of 
taste, smell, the trigeminal system, touch, and so on, that we perceive when 
tasting food’ (auvray and Spence 2008)
(3) “Taste” is often used as a synonym for “flavour”. This usage of “taste” 
probably arose because  
the blend of true taste and retronasal olfaction is perceptually localized to 
the mouth via touch  
(bartoshuk and duffy 2005, p. 27).
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each of these definitions acknowledge that the flavour experiences we have 
when tasting depend on sensory interactions, but they differ in mentioning 
different elements in the interactions. And despite being offered as defini-
tions of flavour, what they actually describe are flavour experiences or fla-
vour perceptions rather than flavours per se. (The definition of Auvray and 
Spence is here more careful, but elsewhere they collapse flavour and flavour 
perception.) If this conflation was deliberate it could be because flavours 
were to thought of as inseparable from our experience of flavours. More 
strongly still, in a view prominent among many psychologists and neurosci-
entists, flavours are not something we perceive: they are just psychological 
constructs (Prescott 1999) or items that arise only in the brain (Shepard 
2012, Small 2013). the idea here is that it is the brain that combined infor-
mation from taste, touch and smell to create flavours. Such configurations 
are just are products of the brain that arise from the binding of different 
sensory elements.  A fairly typical neuroscientific statement of this view is 
given by dana Small (following gordon Shepard):
flavour is in the brain, not the food. It is the brain that integrates the discrete 
sensory inputs from the food and drink we ingest to create flavour perceptions. 
(Small 2013, p. 540) 
The failure, here, to distinguish between flavours and flavour perceptions 
(c.f. colours and colour perception, sounds and sound perception) creates, as 
we shall see, problems for the individuation of flavour experiences. But for 
the moment let’s pursue this view of flavours as arising in us because of sen-
sory combinations produced by the brain.
Consider the three definitions of flavour (perceptions) just given. How are 
the different components mentioned in each definition bound together? The 
talk here is of a ‘combination’ or ‘blend’. more importantly, exactly which 
components get bound together in flavour perceptions? In (1) there is men-
tion of olfactory, gustatory and trigeminal sensations; in (2) there is the ad-
dition of ‘touch, and so on’; while in (3) flavour is restricted to ‘the blend of 
true taste and retronasal olfaction’ where the blending is only mediated by 
touch. 
these different views about which sensory elements go into the multisen-
sory integration that produces flavour perceptions require somewhat dif-
ferent processing stories regarding the how-part, ie. the combining, and the 
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what-part, the contributors to the binding problem . the answer given to the 
hoW question and the What question constrain one another: what is the 
ultimate product of combining inputs from different sensory systems, and 
how do the different sensory inputs combine? 
as we have seen, it is a non-trivial task to explain multisensory integration, and 
as was said above, any fully adequate account of how this happens in flavour 
perception would cast significant light on the nature of multisensory percep-
tion in general. Such an account is still out of reach but it is being pursued vigor-
ously in the sensory sciences, and the literature contains many suggestions of 
the sorts of rules and properties that may be involved in multisensory integra-
tion. Prominent amongst these are the following: 
(i)  Spatio-temporal Unity
(ii)  Superadditivity
(iii) Sensory dominance
(iv)  Semantic congruence
(i) Spatio-temporal Unity
The spatio-temporal unity hypothesis is this: the unity of flavour comes 
from the fact that sensory information of various kinds, or from various ori-
gins is put together when presented as close in time and space. So does the 
unity we find in the flavour experiences just come from the spatio-temporal 
conjunction of sensory inputs we have when eating and drinking? not quite. 
the interaction between the multimodal components goes beyond mere co-
occurrence in consciousness. 
(ii) Superadditivity
We can see a plastic water bottle being crushed, and we can hear a plas-
tic water bottle being crushed, but when we both see and hear the water 
bottle being crushed the neural activation of the perceiver is greater than 
the sum of the separate activations for the visual and the auditory stimuli. 
this is superadditivity: a clue to multisensory integration and a sign of how 
important such events are to the brain. however, superadditivity can also 
occur with out intergration, as in the case of cross-modal effects like sweet-
ness enhancement. combining vanilla aroma with a sucrose solution, where 
the aroma is sensed orthonasally by inhaling, will make that solution taste 
sweeter. this is the sweetness enhancement effect  (cliff and noble 1990; 
Frank et. al 1991; dalton et. al 2000). now although we can recognise the 
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presence of an odour and a taste, we are unaware of how they are interact-
ing to boost the perception of sweetness. this cross-modal effect results in 
a conscious experience but is not the result of conscious combining. being 
presented with just sub-threshold vanilla aroma and just sub-threshold 
sweetness for a sucrose solution will result in a conscious experience of 
sweetness. other factors affect the perception of sweetness, such as a 
creamy texture which can enhance the perceived sweetness, and there are 
interactions between odours and textures.  (bult et al. 2007). certain aromas 
make what’s in the mouth taste creamier, and certain textures can change 
aroma profiles. Is this just due to spatio-temporal combining? It seems to go 
far beyond it is ways we could not have predicted from the co-occurrence of 
these sensory events. 
Moreover, if space and time are the only factors of unity for a flavour F, then 
all information that is processed or perceived as close enough in time and 
space, or attributed to a single cause in space and time, will be components 
of F. So are the sounds heard during crunching an aple or a carrot part of its 
flavour. They can certainly affect the overall experience of the food (Zampi-
ni and Spence 2004) so should they therefore be treated as components of 
flavour. Is there such a thing as auditory flavour?
and what of visual properties of the eating environment, such as lighting, 
which can affect the experience of the food and therefore are components of 
flavour. Does this mean we need to recognise visual flavour?
then there is the perceived weight of the food in the hand – different bowls 
of the same yogurt, one with a weight at the bottom, will, when handed to 
participants to try, affect their perception of the texture, thickness, rich-
ness of the yogurt in each bowl (Spence 2010). So is the weight of the con-
tainer a component of flavour? Surely, we should say that these factors can 
causally affect our perception of flavours, but they are not constitutive (i.e., 
not components of) flavours or flavour perceptions. This is a philosophical 
point that needed to be stressed. not every component or feature of our 
experience of an object or event reveals a constitutive part of that object or 
event. We need to distinguish co-co-occuring or causally affecting versus 
constitutive features of our experience of tasting. there is no agreement 
on WHAT is necessary or constitutive of flavour experience.  This true for 
hedonics, too, because we could ask on the spatio-temporal unity hypoth-
esis whether the hedonic - affective - component of eating and drinking is 
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a constitutive part of flavour or flavour perception. Some have said yes (see 
verhagen 2007) and others no (see Smith 2007, 2010), while for others it is in-
determinate, though they go together and are tested together (see yeomans 
2008). notice, that it would be hard to exclude this feature if we adopted the 
spatio-temporal unity hypothesis. but we should exclude it. the overall ex-
perience that we have when eating may overflow the experience or percep-
tion of flavour. even if people think the main purpose of eating and drinking 
is to determine whether it is pleasurable or not, and whether they want 
more or want to stop, this is different from how the food or drink tastes and 
what its qualities are. if force-fed the same food repetitively, even a food we 
like such as chocolate, we may suddenly find the hedonics switching around 
from liked to disliked. This is stimulus specific satiety. The identity of the 
stimuli stay the same even when the hedonics vary, for if you were suddenly 
offered a different type of chocolate you would notice. (Kringelbach and 
Stein 2010;  o’docherty et al. 2000) also, an experienced taster should be able 
to assess the character and quality of a wine even if it is not to his or her 
taste.  
(iii) Sensory dominance
We have seen that the spatio-temporal hypothesis does not explain su-
peradditivity. nor does it explain patterns of dominance, as when vision 
dominates audition in the vetrioloquist effect, where there is visual capture 
of auditory attention, re-locating our auditory experience to the location 
of the visual source. nor does this hypothesis accommodate the role of ‘ex-
pectations’ in the explanation of perceived flavours since expectations exist 
prior to, and independently of, the actual occurrence of stimuli at that time 
or space. in the sensory and food literature, expectations can have a big im-
pact on perceived flavours. expectations generated by the color of a food or 
beverage, experienced before it is tasted (and stimulation occurs) can lead to 
enhanced (or diminished) perceptions of sweetness or sourness (see Spence 
et al. 2010), because linked to the recognition of a certain kind of food giv-
ing rise to expectations of corresponding kinds of flavours. For example, 
the more intense the color, the more intense the flavour. expectations gen-
erated by different linguistic description of the same food (yeomans et al. 
2008) with smoked salmon ice cream tasting saltier and more savoury when 
labelled as a novel flavour of ice cream rather than as a “frozen savoury 
mousse”.
leaving aside these issues there are other problems for this hypothesis. how 
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do we go from the spatio-temporal combining of multisensory elements to a 
unified percept (At what level does unity occur, and how it is manifest to the 
subject?) Perhaps, space-time and some unity assumption can explain why 
a single object or event is perceived, but how can they explain what we come 
to perceive this object or event as being (e.g. a taste or smell)?  and notice, 
we have not answered the What question about which elements from the 
range offered in definitions (1) to (3) above go into flavour perception.  We 
should also ask what role is played by each of the components, for example 
touch, in (1) – (3)?
(iv) Semantic Congruence
in returning to the hoW – question, can focusing on semantic congruency 
reveal a necessary feature of the relation that constitutes flavour experience?  
according to some, it helps addressing the What issue. combinations of 
qualitative features (odour-taste, odour-colour) is conditioned by congruency. 
For example, strawberry odour + (congruent) sweet taste are combined into 
a flavour, but strawberry odour + (incongruent) salty taste are not, or less so. 
Congruency could also explain the role of expectation in flavour experiences. 
colour-smell expectations depend on the congruency of the two pieces of 
information. Perceived intensity depends on congruency: a lime green drink 
should taste more sour, and a deep red, more sweet, than a neutral coloured 
drink. Sweetness enhancement effects are specific to certain congruent 
odour-tastant pairs. (see Prescott 2004). eg: caramel odour + sweet tastant 
gives rise ot sweetness enhancement. chicken odour + sweet tastant does not.
can the congruency hypothesis explain oral referral? We get this, and so experi-
ence flavours for congruent pairs of taste-odours. Lim and Maxwell (2012) give 
preliminary results in which when a congruent taste(s) was added to an odour, 
referral to the oral cavity and tongue were significantly enhanced. The degree 
of congruency between taste and odour may modulate the degree of odour re-
ferral to the mouth. So congruency could help explain localisation too.
The Congruency Hypotheis is this: unified flavours are constituted by con-
gruently related sensory cues. congruency is not to be thought of as ‘all or 
nothing’ - a sensory cue S1 is more or less congruent with sensory cue S2. 
Flavours would be constituted by these various ‘more or less’ congruency 
relations. Their role in determining flavours suggest they intervene at the 
level of processing and (somhow) determine categorisation.  they can result 
in an determinate flavours (e.g. chicken). Or they can still be manifested as 
flavours with more or less resolution (e.g.  chicken-like flavour, definitely not 
a citrus flavour. Could be a different poultry animal).
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if congruency of different sensory stimuli or inputs is supposed to explain 
the unity of flavour experiences, we need to ask what explains congruency? 
it would be easy to explain congruency by saying when two features are 
considered to be attributes of the same kind of object: strawberry smell 
+ sweet taste + red colour  + strawberry-shape, they belong to one food or 
fruit. but this presupposes a unity and category to which these features 
belong as an ecologically valid part of the environment. however, if there 
are no such configurations in the world but only flavour made in the brain, 
the congruence of flavours cannot come from the outside. All we can fall 
back on are sensory congruencies.  this means when two features ‘match’ so 
that the estimation of one will affect the estimation of the other: e.g. the 
darker the colour, the more intense the flavour (ripeness) the heavier, the 
thicker the yogurt (density correspondence. Why are some sensory pair-
ings congruent? Without resort to semantic congruencies, determined by 
co-occuring configurations of texture, taste, odour and irritant properties 
of foods and liquids, giving them flavour profiles, we just have sensory 
congruencies where features ‘match’ and determine which bundles are 
flavours: These remain subjective, internal and unexplained; flavours as 
complex sensations, revealing nothing beyond themselves.
but rather than settle for this unexplanatory stopping point, with no way to 
prescribe precisely the set of flavour experiences, there is the option of pos-
iting flavours as properties of foods and liquids.  On this view, we could see 
flavours as affordances which our capacities of flavour perception tracks so 
as to guide successful food choice. 
By recognizing that flavours are external features of the environment we 
need not see flavours and flavour perceptions as always coinciding. How we 
taste affects what we taste: the dynamic time course in tasting affects what 
we can pick out when, and a series of perceptual events will allows us to build 
up a profile of the foods and liquids we experience. Tasting is the activity by 
which we assess what we ingest or imbibe hedonically, but this is done of the 
basis of perceptual experiences and these are perceptions of flavours. each act 
of tasting is a snapshot of a flavour profile that we may explore by repeated 
tasting or experiments with flavours. The term flavour does not describe a 
construct of the brain, but it is a technical term used to describe the sapid and 
odourous properties of a solid or liquid, including properties of its tempera-
ture and texture, as well as the power to irritate the trigeminal nerve. Config-
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urations of these properties are flavours and we use multiple senses to track 
them. multi-sensory integration unites information from different sensory 
inputs into perceptual experiences of flavour, where the exact nature of these 
experiences depends on the precise arrangements of textures, odours, and 
tastants/ irritants that generate the sensory inputs. The more unified the con-
figurations that make up flavours, the more unified but complex are the fla-
vour experience whose parts we are unable to distinguish. the science of the 
HOW-WHAT questions about the nature of flavour perceptions leaves room for 
objective flavours.  Flavours are more than a set of congruent relations between 
congruent sensory properties: such congruent sensory properties may track 
congruent real properties of foods and liquids that cause them. it’s nature and 
chefs that make flavours, not brains. Finally, we must distinguish the hedonics 
of eating from the perceptual experience of tasting. eating experience over-
flows flavour perception. The sound of the crispness of an apple is not part of 
flavour, but it is part of the pleasurable experience of eating it.  Many aspects 
that contribute to the hedonic responses that we suppose to be bound up with, 
and revealing of, the flavour or ‘taste’ of something may overflow flavour and 
professional tasters often have to set them aside.
We have seen a need to distinguish flavours from flavour experiences, and 
to see the latter as arising from the combined and integrated use of sensory 
inputs to keep track of the latter. Such experiences are mostly unified and 
yet hard to extricate, at times, from wider notions, such as the overall expe-
rience of eating or drinking, which includes a hedonic response. the case of 
flavour experiences presents a challenge to any philosophical theory that 
supposes we have immediate and authoritative knowledge of the nature and 
character of our own sensory experiences, or that our senses simply inform 
us about the character of our experience. it has taken much recent research 
in psychology and neuroscience to reveal the complexity and interactions 
between our sensory experiences and to direct our attention to aspects of 
those experiences that were overlooked in conscious awareness. even now, 
we face a challenge to say how the integrations of sensory information in 
brain gives rise to unified percepts in conscious experience, and what the 
ultimate nature of those conscious mental items is. 3
3  thanks for comments to members of the audience at the milan Winter School at San 
raffaele, and special thanks to ophelia deroy for her very helpful comments and insights.
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